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On
March 19, 2003, US and British forces invaded Iraq. This was a preemptive strike, the first in US history. There must have been a
really good reason for this unprecedented military action. But, can you
remember what the US preempted or prevented from happening? Most people
who are supportive of the war believe the war was necessary to remove
Saddam Hussein regime from power,
to confront Muslim extremists head on, and to bring democracy to the
Middle East. At times, the Bush administration even made statements
linking Iraq to Al-Qaeda and to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
order to justify the use of force, although the administration eventually
denied making this connection
(see also Rumsfeld
saying the US has 'Bulletproof' Evidence of Iraq's links to Al Qaeda.)
In addition, most people today believe
the continued US occupation of Iraq is necessary to prevent
terrorists from taking over the region essentially the
reverse argument as to why supporters believe we went to war in the
first place. However, unlike the initial rationalization for war, this
view today is shared by supporters and non-supporters of the war alike
including leading Democrats. The only argument now is over how soon the
troops should be pulled out, not over whether they should be there in
the first place.
It was President Bush who first
suggested this new justification for the war in his State of the Union
Address, January 23, 2007, to promote public support for the announced
'troop surge' of more
than 20,000 additional soldiers:
Many in this chamber understand that
America must not fail in Iraq, because you understand that the
consequences of failure would be grievous and far-reaching. If
American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi
government would be overrun by extremists on all sides. We could
expect an epic battle between Shia
extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by al
Qaeda and supporters of the old
regime. A contagion of violence could spill out across the country and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict.
For America, this is a nightmare scenario. For the enemy, this is the
objective. Chaos
is the greatest ally their greatest ally in this struggle.
And out of chaos in Iraq would emerge an emboldened enemy with new
safe havens, new recruits, new resources, and an even greater
determination to harm America. To allow this to happen would be to
ignore the lessons of September the 11th
and invite tragedy.
However, contrary to new and old rationalizations for war, the initial
'justification' for the invasion was not the removal of Saddam
regime, Muslim extremists, or democracy in the Middle East. Rather, the
driving argument for war was Saddam active pursuit and possession of
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs). The purpose
of the US invasion of Iraq was to forcefully disarm Saddam WMD
arsenal. Unfortunately, after the invasion, the US found only limited
quantities of degraded pre-1991
shells. No WMDs, mobile, or
underground production facilities were ever found. (See US
stops search for WMDs
and UN:
Iraq had no WMD after 1994).
Turned out to be Wrong
The following is an excerpt from the President address to the nation where he admits that the intelligence
regarding the existence of WMDs
was wrong:
President
Address to the Nation
December 18, 2005
From this office, nearly three
years ago, I announced the start of military operations in Iraq. Our
coalition confronted a regime that defied United Nations Security
Council resolutions, violated a cease-fire agreement, sponsored
terrorism, and possessed, we believed, weapons of mass destruction.
After the swift fall of Baghdad, we found mass graves filled by a
dictator; we found some capacity to restart programs to produce
weapons of mass destruction, but we did not find those weapons.
It is true that Saddam Hussein had
a history of pursuing and using weapons of mass destruction. It
is true that he systematically concealed those programs, and blocked the
work of U.N. weapons inspectors. It is true that many nations believed
that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. But much of the
intelligence turned out to be wrong.
- The
Bush administration and US intelligence community made gross
misjudgments before the war began,
- Or,
the Bush administration took an active role in exaggerating the
nature, strength, and very existence of intelligence.
A
WMD History Lesson
(Right:
Donald Rumsfeld
shaking hands with Saddam Hussein )
We
tend to think of the Iraq War in terms of a timeline from September 11th
to the present. However, to really understand the invasion of Iraq, one
must first understand the history of US-Iraq relations. During the
1980's the US supported Saddam and supplied his military with many of
the weapons US would later condemn. In addition to weapons, US also gave
Saddam funding to fight against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. At that
time, Iraq was using chemical
warfare was not a concern to
the US because United States supported the defeat of Iran.
In 1990 and 1991 however, after Saddam used his military power to invade
Kuwait something against US interests the US fought against Iraq in
the Gulf War. Following this conflict, the UN passed many resolutions
regarding Iraq, including resolution 687 which required Iraq to destroy
all WMDs as well as their
capability to produce them.
In conjunction with these resolutions, UN weapons inspectors were to
have free access to Iraq. Over the next 7 years, UN inspectors oversaw
the destruction of WMDs but
were critical of Iraq level of cooperation. In 1998, Bill
Clinton approved air strikes against Iraq known as Operation Desert Fox
in which the US and UK bombed many targets throughout Iraq. (See also
Operation Desert Strike 1996, and Operation
Southern Watch – 1993). In
anticipation of the 1998 air strikes, UN inspectors left and were not kicked out as Bush later alleged in his
2002
axis of evil speech.
After having 100 targets bombed, Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors
back into the country to inspect their remaining weapons capabilities.
A
War of Words: Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, and Rumsfeld
After President Bush was elected, members of his administration,
including Condeleeza
Rice and Colin Powell, affirmed in 2001 that Iraq had no WMDs
and that Saddam Hussein was not a threat. These statements, which were
true, were in stark contrast to the flood
of statements purporting the
existence of WMDs unleashed on
the American public by the the Bush administration less than a year
later.
The "War on Terror" shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq after
George W. Bush gave his State
of the Union address in January, 2002,
when he described the axis of evil. These remarks were the
first in a year long propaganda campaign that eventually led to the
Invasion of Iraq. As the time for war drew closer, the administration
became increasingly relentless in their claims that Iraq possessed and
refused to disarm WMDs,
although many politicians and persons in the media were increasingly
skeptical.
Dick Cheney March 24, 2002: This is a man of great evil, as
the President has said. And he is actively pursuing nuclear weapons
at this time. And we think that cause for concern for us and for
everybody in the region.
Donald Rumsfeld – September
26, 2002: We know they have weapons of mass destruction. We know
they have active programs. There is
not
any debate about it. So the idea that if you had an appropriate
inspection regime, that they come back and say you were wrong, is so
far beyond anyone imagination, that its not something I think
about.
Colin Powell, February 5, 2003: One of the most worrisome
things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on
Iraqs biological weapons is the existence of mobile production
facilities used to make biological agents.
George W. Bush, February 6, 2003: Iraq has developed spray
devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles, with ranges far
beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV
launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of
miles inland.
And we have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently
authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons, the very
weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have.
The
claims made in these statements, along with hundreds of documented
others, never materialized. Much of the world and the US population
mistrusted the Bush administration claims that Saddam was hiding a
massive weapons arsenal. Yet, the US ignored the skeptics and went to
war using insufficient intelligence. This point is very important to
realize. Any of us who lived through that time can remember the heated
debate over whether WMDs existed. The Bush administration bold
assertions were often made to counter intense skepticism regarding the
Unites States true intentions for invading. Hence, it is hard to imagine the
administration didn't know exactly what they were doing when making
statements that, "turned out to be wrong. This is not about turning out to be
wrong, as Bush has claimed. This is about
being wrong, and promoting wrong intelligence, from the very beginning,
knowingly. (See Scott
Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector (1991 -1998), speak out about
the US's true intentions prior to the invasion.)
(Please see an excellent documentary called
Leading
to War that chronicles the
build-up of the war using only video clips of statements made by the
Bush administration; or read a transcript
of the documentary.)
What
is
worse, and unbeknownst to most Americans, during the three months of UN
weapons inspections prior to the invasion, Iraq was complying with
weapons inspectors more than ever before.
Resolution 1441—One last chance
Towards the end of 2002, Iraq government agreed to allow UN weapons
inspectors back into the country and the US, and the UK made a push to
pass UN resolution 1441. This resolution alleged that Iraq was still in
violation of the earlier mentioned Resolution 687 that required Iraq to
destroy its WMDs following the
Gulf War. This new resolution (1441) required Iraq to comply immediately, unconditionally and actively, with every term
of the resolution, giving Iraq its final chance to destroy its WMDs
before having to face serious consequences.
Progress and Cooperation
Weapons Inspectors entered Iraq for the first time in 4 years on
November 27, 2002. On March 7, 2003, after only three months of
inspections, Chief
UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix
reported substantial progress and cooperation in Iraq:
Inspections in Iraq resumed on the 27th of November 2002. In
matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have
faced relatively few difficulties, and certainly much less than
those that were faced by UNSCOM [U.N. Special Commission] in the period
1991 to 1998. He stated that, The Iraqi side has
tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding
helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far persisted in
this or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection
rights. If it did, we would report it.
After three months, UN inspectors received a level of cooperation from
Iraq never reached during the entire decade after the gulf war. Keep in
mind, this progress was reported two weeks before the US invaded.
A
Substantial Measure of Disarmament
Blix
went on to point out specific areas of progress made over the three
month period, including the destruction of 96 missiles that exceeded the
150 km range allowed by UN resolutions:
While
during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that
the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible
range set by the Security Council. The calculations of an international
panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since
accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has
started the process of destruction under our supervision.
The
destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament,
indeed the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not
watching the breaking of toothpicks; lethal weapons are being
destroyed.
The
destruction of the Al Samoud 2 missiles was one of the outstanding
(incomplete) objectives of the Operation Desert Fox airstrike in 1998.
In Blix words, this was the most substantial measure of
disarmament...since the middle of the 1990s.
According
to the Commission
on the intelligence capabilities of the US regarding WMDs, the
Intelligence regarding the existence of the Al Samoud 2 missiles was the
only intelligence the US ended up being right about prior to invading.
All of the WMD intelligence was wrong. Is it merely coincidence that the
US invaded after significantly weakening Saddam's actual weapons
capabilities? (See BBC
news report the destruction of the Al Samoud 2 missiles.)
The
official objective of the 2003 invasion and the official
objective of Operation Desert Fox were one in the same, the disarmament
of Iraq’s WMDs by military force. However, half of the targeted sites
by Operation Desert Fox were the known sleeping quarters of Saddam and
his regime. Only 13 of the 100 targeted sites were associated with
chemical warfare, biological warfare, and ballistic missiles. Apparently,
the real objective of Operation Desert Fox was the elimination of
Saddam's regime.
In
2003, US troops would invade and remove Saddam's regime, completing
what was the US's real objective all along. As the convenient timing
of the invasion indicates, the 2003 invasion was also primarily
concerned with the removal of Saddam's regime, not the disarmament of
WMDs.
Remaining
Tasks
Despite the notable progress and increased cooperation, Blix
acknowledged that remaining tasks needed to be completed and said:
How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining
disarmament tasks? While cooperation can – cooperation can
and is to be immediate, disarmament, and at any rate verification of it,
cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by
continued outside pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites
and items, analyze documents, interview relevant persons and draw
conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, but months.
Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament
inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in
accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained
inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after
verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm if signs
were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programs.
Here, UN weapons inspectors gave a short timeline of what the US could
anticipate going forward. After over a decade of conflict, based on the
current Iraqi cooperation, verification of disarmament was to take
months, and a remaining monitoring system would ensure our continued
safety.
Where were the WMDs according to US intelligence? Underground and
Mobile...Of Course.
Mobile
Vehicles: Special Mobile Trucks can use for Mobile Biological
Weapons & Mobile Atomic Weapons
In
addition to reporting substantial progress and cooperation, Blix went on
to emphasize that, contrary to US intelligence estimates, UN inspectors
had found no evidence of mobile or underground weapons facilities:
Mobile facilities:
intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass
destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks, in particular that there
are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side
states that such activities do not exist.
"Several inspections have taken place at declared and
undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities.
Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen as
well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence
of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected
to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks
of ground transportation."
Underground
facilities:
There have been reports, denied
from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted
underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground
structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass
destruction.
During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection
teams have examined building structures for any possible underground
facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was
used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for
chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.
Absent for 4 Years
Towards the end of his report, Blix explained that a draft
working document was to be submitted to the UN Security Council for
approval the same month. The document addressed "unresolved
disarmament issues," and identified key remaining disarmament
tasks. Notice what Blix said about the amount of information
contained in the working document for the period between 1998 and 2003:
I should note that the working document contains much
information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of
1998, including information which has come to light after 1998. It contains
much less information and discussion about the period after 1998,
primarily because of paucity [scarcity] of information.
Nevertheless, intelligence
agencies have
expressed the view that proscribed programs have continued or restarted
in this period. It
is further contended that proscribed programs and items are located in underground
facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being
moved around Iraq. The working document does contain suggestions
on how these concerns may be tackled."
Because weapons inspectors were absent 4 years, they could not
confidently say whether mobile or underground facilities existed. When
UN weapons inspectors demanded to see US intelligence evidencing the
existence of those facilities, the US refused to reveal that
intelligence. The WMDs were exactly where the US wanted them,
underground and mobile, so that no one in the international community,
including UN weapons inspectors could determine whether WMDs actually
existed. In reality, if the US had waited to invade, the UN would have
confirmed to the world that the WMDs and mobile and underground weapons
facilities did not exist.
Nuclear Weapons Programs
A week later (just four days before the invasion), intelligence
documents the US had claimed were strong evidence of Iraq nuclear
weapons programs were dismissed by the UN as forgeries. However, the
question has never been answered as to who forged these documents
originally identified by the US as such 'strong evidence.' According to
a CNN article, experts said the suspects include the
intelligence services of Iraq neighbors, other pro-war nations, Iraqi
opposition groups or simply con men. Most rule out the United
States, Great Britain or Israel because they said those countries
intelligence services would have been able to make much more convincing
forgeries if they had chosen to do so. President Bush
even highlighted the documents in his State of the Union address on
January 28. (See Fake
Iraq documents 'embarrassing' for US).
A
year after the invasion, Hans Blix accused the US and UK of dramatizing
the threat of WMDs in order to strengthen the case for the war in
an interview with the BBC. (See also Hans
Blix questioned the way Tony Blair and George Bush managed intelligence
prior to the invasion and Former
chief UN weapons inspector Dr Hans Blix: The intelligence was not
so strong).
Manipulating the Reported Progress
The
Bush administration countered the progress reported on March 7, 2002, by
repeating the claim to the American public that our intelligence
indicated that Saddam was using mobile and underground weapons
facilities to hide his WMD programs.
Such an opposite and defiant reaction from the administration to
reported progress from weapons inspectors was foreseeable. Months before
the inspections began, the Bush administration had hedged against the
possibility of reported progress and cooperation from Iraq. In August
2002, three months before inspections, Cheney had voiced his disapproval
of inspectors entering Iraq altogether, claiming that inspections would
only be detrimental by giving a false sense of security:
A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of
his [Saddam] compliance with the UN resolutions. On the contrary,
there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam
was somehow back in his box.
If the US was so sure of the existence of WMDs, why would Cheney be
worried that that inspectors would not find them, months before
inspections began?
Enter
Bush and Powell
In addition to the administration
attempts to counter the possibility of reported cooperation and progress
months before inspections began, on the same day Hans Blix reported,
Colin Powell was also prepared to ward off the reported progress before
the UN. According to Powell, the progress and cooperation reported by
weapons inspectors fell short. After all under resolution 1441, Iraq had
to comply immediately, unconditionally and actively or else face
serious consequences. He also continued to assert that he knew underground and mobile facilities existed:
UNITED
NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTORS REPORT
TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON
PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ
UN
Press Release
[Colin Powell] said today meeting concerned a very, very
important question, namely, whether the Iraqi leadership had made the
decision to comply with Security Council resolutions and to rid itself
of all weapons of mass destruction and infrastructure for such weapons.
The answer was not about how many inspectors were on the ground, or
how much more time and effort should be given, nor whether more
benchmarks were needed. The answer depended on whether Iraq had made the
choice to actively cooperate in every possible manner in the immediate
and complete disarmament of its prohibited weapons.
Today briefings had shed more light on that difficult question, he
said. He had listened very carefully to hear if Iraq had finally
understood that the will of the international community must be obeyed. He
was pleased to hear some new progress and activity with respect to
substance, but he was sorry that that was all still coming in a grudging
manner and that Iraq was still refusing to offer immediate, active and
unconditional cooperation not late, but immediate, not passive,
but active, and not conditional, but unconditional in every respect.
Despite some progress, he still found a catalogue of non-cooperation. If
Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, he would not have to worry about
setting up the means to look for mobile
biological units, and search extensively for the underground facilities he
knew existed
I Cannot Tell a Lie ~George Washington
Unfortunately, the next day, President Bush misled the public with
regard to the reported progress and cooperation in a radio address,
leading the unquestioning public to believe that the March 7 report by
UN weapons inspectors actually concluded that Iraq did in fact have WMDs:
War
on Terror President's Radio Address Audio
March 8, 2003
President Bush: The
Chief United Nations Weapons Inspector reported yesterday to the
Security Council on his efforts to verify Saddam Hussein's compliance
with Resolution 1441. This resolution requires Iraq to fully and
unconditionally disarm itself of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons materials, as well as the prohibited missiles that could be used
to deliver them. Unfortunately, it is clear that Saddam Hussein is
still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm.
(Notice how this last statement appears to be the UN inspectors conclusion
but nothing could be further from the truth.)
our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying
these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very
same type of missiles…If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we
would know it – because we would see it; Iraq weapons
would be presented to inspectors and destroyed. Inspection teams do
not need more time, or more personnel – all they need is what they
have never received, the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime.
The attacks of September the 11, 2001 showed what the
enemies of America did with four airplanes. We
will not wait to see what terrorists or terror states could do with
weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to confront threats
wherever they arise. And, as a last resort, we must be willing to use
military force. We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq.
But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by
force.
Military
Force One way or another
Based
on the logic Powell and Bush use, it is clear the use of military force
never hinged on proof of the existence of WMDs. After all, the
administration already knew Saddam had WMDs they didnot need
proof from the UN. No, the invasion hinged on whether Saddam complied
with every term of resolution 1441, immediately, unconditionally and
actively, as Colin Powell emphasized in his retort to Hans Blix's
report.
Rather
than grant the few months requested by weapons inspectors to complete
the UN inspection, the US and UK took action. Incredibly, on the same
day of Hans Blix report, the US,
UK, and Spain presented a drafted UN Security Council resolution
that said:
Iraq
will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by
resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the
Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional,
immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament
obligations under resolution 1441 and previous relevant resolutions, and
is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons,
weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by
resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all
information regarding prior destruction of such items.
If
passed, the resolution would have given UN authorization to carry out
the serious consequences warned of in resolution 1441—the
use of military force. However, after facing opposition in the UN from
other countries, the US, UK, and Spain abandoned their efforts to pass
this new resolution. Instead, the administration invaded Iraq on March
19, 2003, under authorization they had received in October, 2002 when
congress circumvented the Constitution by granting power to the
President to use military power to disarm Iraq, without officially
declaring war. Reminiscent of Viet Nam, congress has never actually
declared war on Iraq.
Hindsight
is 20/20
After
the invasion, the
Iraq Survey Group concluded
that Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and that
Saddam ended the country's nuclear program after the Persian Gulf War in
1991. The Iraq Survey Group also concluded that UN inspectors were in
the process of confirming these facts before the invasion. Bush's
continued defense of the war, regardless of these findings, only makes
sense when you realize the US never cared whether WMDs existed.
History
Rewritten
The
buildup to the war using false intelligence is consistently explained
away by the media and politicians as a mistake or intelligence failure and the responsibility of the Bush
administration is left out of the equation. Today, no one ever explores
the possibility that the Bush administration distorted the facts in
order to scare the public and fuel support for the invasion. At worst,
the administration's culpability is explained away as a willingness to rush to
war.
The
Report
on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assesments on
Iraq is an example of an
attempt to cast the blame on the intelligence community and away from
the Bush administration:
Ordered
Reported on July 7, 2004
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
Overall Conclusions - Weapons of Mass Destruction
Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence
Community October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either
overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence
reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade
craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence...
Conclusion
2. The Intelligence Community did not accurately or adequately
explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in
the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate…
Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective
presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) program. This group dynamic led
Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret
ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as
well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active
and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs. This presumption was
so strong that formalized Intelligence Community mechanisms established
to challenge assumptions and group think were not utilized…
Conclusion
4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the National
Intelligence Estimate suffers from a layering effect whereby
assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying
forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments…
Conclusion
5. In each instance where the Committee found an analytic or
collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of
Intelligence Community managers throughout their leadership chains
to adequately supervise the work of their analysts and collectors. They did
not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider
alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence
reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity…
Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost
every aspect of the Intelligence Community's human intelligence
collection efforts against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
activities, in particular that the Community had no sources
collecting against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after 1998.
Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate
culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional
funding and personnel.
At the time this 2004 report was released, the Senate Committee decided
to postpone "phase II" of their investigation: their
investigation of how senior policymakers (i.e., the Bush administration)
misused intelligence to build a case for war.
Senator
Pat Roberts (R-KS), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, said, in regard to whether the committee should complete phase II of the investigation,
I don't think there
should be any doubt that we have now heard it all regarding prewar
intelligence. I think that it would be a monumental waste of time to
replow this ground any further. (See Senator
Roberts remarks on the WMD Comission Report.)
To
date, there has been no assessment released regarding the Bush
administration's conduct, handling of intelligence, or influence on the
intelligence community. The "phase II" report is due to be released
June 2008, 5 years after the war began.
How
Policymakers used the Intelligence
The US government official accounts of the WMD controversy,
authorized by the president, is summarized in a document called the Commission
on the intelligence capabilities of the US regarding WMDs:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, MARCH 31, 2005
On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States
government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear
weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon
production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical
weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the US Intelligence
Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was
over.
While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that
Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in the end it was the United
States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most
public—and most damaging—intelligence failures in recent American
history…
While
laudable steps were taken to improve our intelligence agencies after
September 11, 2001, the agencies have done less in response to the
failures over Iraq, and we believe that many within those agencies do
not accept the conclusion that we reached after our year of study: that
the Community needs fundamental change if it is to successfully confront
the threats of the 21st century…
…we were not authorized to investigate how policymakers [the Bush
administration] used the intelligence assessments they received from
the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, while during the course of our
investigation, we interviewed a host of current and former
policymakers, the purpose of those interviews was to learn about how
the Intelligence Community reached and communicated its judgments
about Iraq’s weapons programs—not to review how policymakers
subsequently used that information…
In October 2002, at the request of members of Congress, the National
Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—the
most authoritative intelligence assessment produced by the Intelligence
Community— which concluded that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program and was actively pursuing a nuclear device. According
to the exhaustive study of the Iraq Survey Group, this assessment was
almost completely wrong. The NIE said that Iraq’s biological
weapons capability was larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War
and that Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons production facilities.
This was wrong. The NIE further stated that Iraq had renewed
production of chemical weapons, including mustard, sarin, GF, and VX,
and that it had accumulated chemical stockpiles of between 100 and 500
metric tons. All of this was also wrong. Finally, the NIE
concluded that Iraq had unmanned aerial vehicles that were probably
intended for the delivery of biological weapons, and ballistic missiles
that had ranges greater than the United Nations’ permitted 150
kilometer range. In truth, the aerial vehicles were not for biological
weapons; some of Iraq’s missiles were, however, capable of traveling
more than 150 kilometers. The Intelligence Community’s Iraq
assessments were, in short, riddled with errors.
Notice once again that the only claims
that were correct were those regarding the short-range missiles. The
incessant criticism of the intelligence community is an obvious effort
to remove the blame from the truly culpable parties. In the middle of
this statement is the glaring admission that no investigation into how
the Bush administration used the intelligence was ever authorized. Then,
despite their findings, the report sickeningly seeks not only to
submerge, but to perpetuate the scandal by again promoting the WMD
scare, claiming that, no matter how much we improve the
Intelligence Community, weapons of mass destruction will continue to
pose an enormous threat. Ironically,
the intelligence community had not erred at all, in fact it worked hand
in hand with the Bush administration, deceiving the international
community and persuading UN inspectors of the necessity of disarming
Iraq before the invasion. In addition to assisting in the WMD deception,
our intelligence community even spied on the UN Security Council during
this time.
Bugging
the UN
A year after the invasion, evidence of a
proposed effort to bug UN security council representatives (around the
time the US was seeking approval from the council) came to light. A
British government translator leaked
a document allegedly from an American National Security
Agency requesting that British intelligence put wiretaps on
delegates to the UN security council. So, While US and British
intelligence agencies 'failed' to get the intelligence regarding our
enemies correct, they, for what ever reason, saw the importance of
snooping on our allies. Why was this necessary if they believed so
strongly in their evidence of Iraq's WMDs at the time?
Even Hans Blix revealed that he suspected
the US had bugged his home and office. Blix comments on the situation says it all:
It feels like an
intrusion into your integrity in a situation when you are actually on
the same side.
Conclusion
In
conclusion, We agree with Colin
Powell when he stated that there was no justification for the
invasion absent the existence of WMDs. If the invasion was not justified
then, as Colin Powell explained, how can the continuation of the war be
justifiable now? Freedom, terrorism, and removing Saddam were not good
enough reasons for war from the outset, so how can these reasons be good
enough now? The Bush administration would never have garnered enough
international or domestic support for a war based on those reasons. (See
Scott
Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector (1991 - 1998), summarize the
WMD and Iraq war issue.)
It
is sometimes difficult to accept information that contradicts what we
have held to be true for so long. I, for one, was once very supportive
of President Bush. I sought to justify the Iraq War using much of the
information that I later learned to be false. However, when I decided to
research the war in depth, on my own, the truth about the war was
surprisingly clear. I was able to take things in little by little, and
to answer many of my own unanswered questions.
Today, it is the natural reaction of
almost everyone I present this information to, who supports the war, to
question my sources and criticize me for being narrow-minded and for
refusing to examine the 'other side' of the issue. What is ironic about
these accusations is that primary sources that prove the truth about the
war are abundant. After seeing direct
contradictions made by the Bush administration as they seek to
justify the invasion, where am I supposed to look for credible
information in favor of the war? One would have to be unaware of hard
historic facts to believe there was still an initial justification for
the invasion, or to believe that our government merely made a
"mistake” by using the WMD justification. Simply put, to imagine
that there was justification for war, or that the Bush administration
perhaps didn’t realize the extent to which they were wrong, flies in
the face of reason.
- Iraq
had no WMDs after
all
- Each
of the highest ranking officials in the Bush administration
continually spoke of the existence of WMDs as fact
- Two
weeks before the invasion, chief UN weapons inspectors reported that
no WMDs, or weapons facilities, including mobile or
underground facilities, had been found
- The
US ignored the lack of WMD findings by UN inspectors and misled
the public regarding those findings, continuing to
emphasize the existence of underground and mobile facilities
- Two
weeks before the invasion, chief UN weapons inspectors reported the highest
level of progress and cooperation from Iraq since the Gulf War
- The
US ignored the reports by UN inspectors of Iraqi cooperation and misled
the public regarding that reported cooperation
- The
US went to war without a declaration, having never
been attacked by Iraq and, to the contrary, after attacking Iraq for
decades
- The
intelligence community is consistently blamed
for the erroneous WMD claims
Do
you see why President Bush changed the justification argument from
WMDs to raging tyrants, extremists, and al Qaeda? Even
he knows the 'other side' of the argument is unsubstantiated.
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